Abstract-When replace railway interlocking devices, setting up of large number of signal cables and confirming of wiring connections are required. So, it is worried that serious transport disorder caused by human error in wiring works would occur. We have developed a railway signal control system utilized optical LAN to reduce the signal cables and wiring works. Moreover, all signal devices operate independently, designers have to handle all devices one by one and pay great attention to avoid causing harmful influence each other. We propose the data-driven method to make easy to replace interlocking device. This logic is r earranged according to the field device in order to simplify and decrease design duties of designe rs. In this paper, we introduce this system, and describe network transmission, safety-related communication and software configuration of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have been improving the railway system continuously to realize better services which meet user's needs, such as increasing of transportation capacity and the direct operation extend over multiple lines. The development of this system requires the changing of control logic and wayside signal devices. In this changing works, we have some problems.
The first problem is that the construction of signal devices needs enormous amount of wiring. So, it has high possibility of human error that causes transport disorders. An enormous work load means substantial cost.
The second problem is that control logic must be rearranged to improve signal devices. This part consists of the hard-wired logic such as a relay circuit, and then we have to make a great effort in the design of this logic.
East Japan Railway Company has been developing a new signal control system based on the IP-network to solve those problems [ 1] . This system composes a controls signal devices by digital information exchange through the optical network. This system can reduce cable construction work, and increase efficiency of system test and operation, and also save construction cost. Furthermore, new control logic can reduce the design work.
In this paper, we describe problems of the present signal control system and introduce a configuration of this system. We consider safety-related communication that is essential to railway signal devices. Then we explain software approach of this system and new function that can be realized by this approach.
II. PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT SIGNAL DEVICES
The signal control systems are dramatically developed, mainly because of the computer technologies. Nevertheless, they have some problems about signal control and route control.
A. Problems of the Current Signal Devices
First, as shown in Fig. 1 , since the control logic is usually installed in the computer room of a station yard and the operational part is at the rail-side area, electric wires from the central area to the rail-side are still needed. For example, an interlocking device directly controls signal devices by applying electric voltage to copper wires. Enormous amount of wirings are required because an interlocking device controls a number of signal devices. When the transport capacity increases, or an interlocking device becomes too old, the interlocking device will be replaced. It requires much time and is a manual work because a large number of wirings are needed. It may causes human errors lead to a serious transport disorder. Then, reduction of cabling and conduction check is required.
Second, since the transmission path of the current system is a simplex structure, it also causes serious transport disorders when cables have damaged. Therefore, the duplex structure of the control system for field devices is required.
B. Problems in route control
On a signal construction, such as adding of a new signal device, a logical controller also should be changed. Since the logical controllers are set up individually and they have different software and operate independently, designers have to handle all controllers one by one and pay great attention to avoid causing bad influence each other.
When designers change the logic about a signal device, the influence extends over other logics, because signal devices interlock directly each other. Eventually, a designer must evaluate whether there is influence of change about all signal devices. Design work becomes hard. Therefore, a new software architecture using indirect interlocking is required.
III. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
To reduce transport disorder from errors in the work, we have developed a signal control system using optical LAN. This system is changed from control of signal devices electrically by using signal cables to control of signal devices by data transmission using optical cables [2] . Fig. 2 shows the purposes and characteristics of this system. This system transmits and receives control data and result data between a Logic Controller (LC) installed in a signal house at the station and a Field Controller (FC) embedded in a signal device through the optical network. This system configuration is shown as Fig. 3 .
A. Logic Controller (LC)
A LC is the safety-related computer and controls signal devices on the railway line in place of the interlocking device. It has various control functions such as route control, signal indication control, automatic train protection ( ATP) control and level c rossing control. These functions were realized in separate controllers conventionally.
The LC generates control data based on control directions from the traffic control system and result data from related signal devices, and sends the control data to signal devices that are connected to this system.
In addition, software configuration of the LC solvi ng problems about route control is written down in Chapter 5.
B. E-PON
An E -PON (Ethernet-Passive Optical Network) has been adopted in this system, as shown in Fig. 4 . It is a general-purpose optical fiber transmission system, which is composed of an Optical Line Termination (OLT) that is installed in the signal house and an Optical Network Unit (ONU) that is built into the FC. It is suitable for constructing a network for the railway signal control system for the following reasons. 1) A full-duplex transmission is possible with one optical fiber. 2) Up to 32 FCs can be connected by splitting an optical fiber. A n optical coupler splits the optical fiber, which does not use electric power. 
C. Field Controller (FC)
A FC is the safety-related electric device and is embedded in the signal device, as shown in Fig. 5 . It is composed of standard parts: power supply unit, transmission unit, fail-safe logic unit and I/O unit. They are combined and constructed to be suitable for the signal device package.
The FC decodes the control data from the LC and electrically controls the signal device's behavior, such as lighting signal lights and changing switches, in accordance with the contents of the control data, as shown in Fig. 6 . After that, the FC sends the result data back to the LC.
The FC also has a function which monitors the status of the signal device and sends a monitoring data which shows the status of the signal device to a Remote Server.
D. Remote Server/Client, Maintenance Terminal
It is not easy to go along the railway line to monitor signal devices. Therefore, in this system, a Remote Server, a Remote C lient and a Maintenance Terminal are installed in the signal house and can have functions for a monitor and for maintenance of the FCs and signal devices. The Remote Server and the Remote Client has a function of getting specific information about the status of signal devices and the network and can operate to the system configuration.
The Maintenance Terminal has several functions such as reset, install and test to maintain the FC. It is not connected to the network when not in use.
IV. SAFETY-RELATED COMMUNICATION
Though the LC and FC require safety-related communication, the E-PON uses the Ethernet that is a non-trusted transmission system. An international standard named IEC 62280-1 gives the basic requirements needed in order to achieve safety-related communication between safety-related devices connected the transmission system [3] . We applied this standard to our system.
A. Network configuration
To improve the system availability, the transmission line network and all devices have duplex configurations in this system. The LC and FC transfer data through both networks of transmission lines, which are shown in Fig. 7 .
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is used for the transmission between the LC and FC, which is widely used for fast communications. The LC and FC evaluate the received data to ensure safety of the signal control. Table I shows the preconditions to apply IEC 62280-1. We realized that the transmission system of this system satisfied these precondition by the following consideration. 1) The network system related signal control is functionally independent from the network related supervision that is not safety-related. The traffic of this network is fixed and clarified in design.
2) The traffic of remote server/client and maintenance terminal does not exceed the maximum value which is defined in design.
3) The access to this network via intranet from anonymous maintenance terminal is protected by certification mechanism which is implemented in the remote server. 4) The maximum number of the FC and the traffic of the network are defined based on the result of preliminary test using actual devices. Table II shows the requirements in IEC 62280-1 which safety-related communication in closed transmission systems shall satisfy. The LC and FC satisfy these requirements by the following consideration. 1) Both the LC and FC are safety-related devices (R1, R13 and R14). 2) If the LC detects some error, it sends control data which control corresponding signal devices to the safe-side status . In case of the LC or FC detects some fault in received data, the LC or FC consider that safe-side data was received (R2, R3, R10, R12 and R16).
C. Safety-related communication between the LC and FC
3) The FC has normal mode (safety-related equipment such as the LC controls the FC) and maintenance mode ( non-safety-related equipment such as maintenance terminal controls the FC). The FC cannot behave as those modes at the same time (R4, R11). 4) Both the LC and FC are designed as the top level of safety integrity (i.e. SIL4) (R5, R6). 5) An ID code defining the source address and destination address is added to the data. The receiving device identifies the validity of the ID code (R7). 6) A CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) code is added to the data in the sending device separate from the FCS (Frame Check Sequence) of the Ethernet frame and is checked by the receiving devices (R8, R10 and R12). 7) A sequence number added to the data is checked (R9). 8) The LC watches transmission delay between the control data and the result data. The LC and FC have a common machine cycle. The LC sends the control data every machine cycle to the FCs. The FC sends the result data within further less than machine cycle back to the LC (R12). 
R3
Error detection mechanism shall be applied at the receiver and shall be consistent with the safety requirements of the receiver.
R4
The implementation of the safety reaction R2 shall be functionally independent of the non-trusted transmission system.
R5
The residual data error rate of the safety-related transmission system for each information interchange between transmitter and receiver shall be less than a predefined value. This rate shall be compatible with the safety integrity level of each receiver.
R6
The safety integrity level of the safety-related transmission system shall be consistent with the highest safety integrity level of the safety processes. Safety Procedure Requirements
R7
If the source is not uniquely identified in the transmission system, authenticity shall be provided by adding a source identifier to user data.
R8
Integrity shall be provided by adding a safety code to the user data. The safety process shall not rely on the transmission code generated and checked by integrated circuits being part of the non-trusted transmission system.
R9
The timeliness of user data shall be provided by adding the information to the user data. The time delay which is allowed depends on the application.
R10
If necessary the sequence of messages shall be checked by the safety process.
R11
The safety procedures for the safety-related equipment shall be functionally independent of the procedures used by the nontrusted transmission system.
R12
All safety-related equipment shall monitor the performance of the requirements listed in R7, R8, R9 and R10. If the quality of the transmission falls below a level, which is predefined in the system requirement specification then an appropriate safety reaction shall be triggered.
Safety Code Requirements

R13
Safety-related and non-safety-related messages shall have different structures achieved by applying a safety code to safetyrelated messages. This safety code shall be capable of protecting the system to the required safety integrity level that a non-safety related message changes to a safety-related one.
R14
The safety procedures of the safety-related equipment shall be functionally independent from the procedures used by the nontrusted transmission system and by the non-safety-related equipment.
R15
To fulfill the required safety integrity level, it is necessary to detect and act on typical faults of the non-trusted transmission system.
R16
To fulfill the required safety integrity level, it is necessary to detect and act on typical errors.
R17
The safety code shall be functionally independent from the transmission code.
R18
The safety code shall guarantee that the non-trusted transmission system shall be very unlikely to be able to generate a correct safety code word. 
No. Preconditions
Rr1 The transmission system is closed
Rr2
The number of pieces of connectable equipment (e ither safetyrelated or not) to the transmission system has to be known and fixed.
Rr3
The physical characteristics of the transmission system are fixed (e.g. transmission media, environment under worst case conditions, etc.).
9) When a send-receive error has occurred in transmission systems, the system is controlled by the safe-side (R15). 10) The transmission code does not be used to detect error in transmission systems (R17). 11) The transmission system does not have a function which is able to generate a correct safety code word (R18).
D. Example analysis
The UDP is used for transmitting between the LC and FC as previously mentioned. However, the UDP does not ensure the trusted transmission because it does not have retransmission processing. Then in order to avoid missing of the commands in the data flow process, we have developed a special indicator named "out-of-time flag" to detect troubles of the transmission paths immediately as shown in Fig. 8 .
The error of transmission paths are caused by the disorder of the sequence numbers, the transmission delays, incorrect deliveries of the commands, or errors of the CRC in the LC/FC. In case the data flows from an LC to an FC incorrectly, the LC sets the out-of-time flag to the next command for the FC. When the FC receives the out-of-time flag, it recognizes the data, which is including the flag may be incorrect. On the other hand, in case an FC finds an error in the transmissions, the FC sends no feedback to the LC. Then the LC recognizes that there is some malfunctions in the transmission paths and set the out-of-time flag to the next control commands.
Moreover, while the flag is active, the LC and the FC change their states to the irregular states. The train operations will be kept on the safe-side if they are at the irregular states. When the transmission path changes in a good state, the LC cancels the flag and the FC recognizes the recovery of the transmission paths. In spite we use the UDP for the communication, the assistance of the out-oftime flag enables us to detect the malfunction of the transmission paths immediately, and operate the LC/FC adequately in case the commands are in bad states.
V. SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION OF THE LC
Software of the LC revises the following three points to reduce designer's work with a system change and to secure time for maintenance.
A. Review of the Control Logic
Since current signal devices have to operate independently, they sometimes have same logics inside. Then, we shift all signal logics hard-wired to software by unifying of system architecture shown in Fig.9 and applying of autonomous decentralized architecture to the software [4] . And then, to eliminate physical interface between functions, we integrate various logic controllers into one logic controller. It is able to estimate easily whether an improvement of a certain signal device influences other devices.
Logic of the LC consists following two hierarchies.
1) Signal device Layer 2) Train Tracking Layer
Signal device Layer attracts the control logic of the signal devices. This layer controls FC and receives a control result from it. Each of the signal devices has control data, reserves or refers tracks. They give tracks reservations in order to control signals. The signal becomes proceed signal when it give all reservations that is necessary. Train Tracking Layer is a set of track and accepts a reservation from signal devices and returns a result to reference. Each track receives only one reservation as a general rule. In a conventional interlocking device's case, reservations use only for signal control including color light signals [5] .
In case of the LC, these reservations are used not only for signal control, but also for automatic train protection (ATP) balises control and level crossing control. Reservations enrich its contents to meet all signal devices' needs (e.g. indication of a signal, a position of a train, a direction of switch). Tr ain tracking layer has all of these reservations. Fig.10 shows an example of relations between signal device object and tracking object. All interactions between signal devices are realized through the information registered on tracking object. Signal devices decide their own behavior, and sends control data to FCs. It is not necessary to register interlock of signal devices directly. Each signal device object doesn't have interaction. Influence of software change is localized and clarified. Much the same is true on a design of ATP and level crossing. As a result, design duties of a designer decrease.
B. Coexistence of Systems
There are a variety of exclusive control devices such as the train detector, the ATS balises and the level crossing control device. These control devices are independent functionally. When the LC is installed, the continued use of these same devices is efficient.
The LC is safety-related devi ce which has functions of control signal devices and can configure for minimum functions. When one of the old exclusive control devices is removed, the function of that device is added to the LC. The other exclusive control devices and the LC process the control data and exchange the control data through the interface between them. In this way, system introduction can be managed economically and systematically, as shown in Fig. 11 .
C. Coexistence with Train Operation and Maintenance Work
In current interlocking device, it is impossible to change the interlocking parameter partially, because that is very complex work. And then, maintenance work must be performed during a brief break to operate a train according to the diagram precisely. As a result, there is not enough time for maintenance. Much the same is true on device improvement work.
Therefore, A LC has the function to coexistence of train operation and maintenance work as shown in Fig.12 . Station yard is divided into two domains in a short time , for train operation and for maintenance or signal construction. Certain signal device concerned with tracks only in one domain are exclusive and can be controlled by corresponding LC freely. One domain named "A" becomes an area for train operation controlled by regular LC, and the other domain named "B" becomes maintenance working area controlled by extra LC which is connected temporarily.
On the other hand, signal devices concerned with tracks in both domains is shared and would be locked to safety state by regular LC (e.g. the signal shown in domain B). Regular LC and extra one take their share of responsibility for interlocking, so that two domains do not interfere.
This function needs only a domain division data, and does not need a new interlocking data for each domain. When setting of a division domain is inputted, this function is carried out. 
D. Unification of Data Structure
With conventional signal devices, the control data and monitor data had an original format each. Therefore these data were checked whether relations did not have an error, and these formats were converted manually as necessary. This is one of the causes to complicate design work.
These data format of the LC are defined based on a common schema. Then, they can convert automatically and unify management of the data in order to prevent conversion error. It becomes easy to validate and check control data of the LC.
E. Design Support Tool
A design support tool helps designers design control data. A rearrangement of the control logic causes a reduction in i mportance of appointing interlocking directly, and it becomes important to appoint a position of the device. A design support tool facilitates data input and validates them. Fig. 13 shows the flow of control data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described problems of signal control and introduced the signal control system that uses optical LAN. To provide safety and reliable railway transportation servi ces, we have introduced the signal system based on network technology, and also, design duties are decreased and design validation are possible by a review of software of the LC.
In other words, we have made the progress from electric control via metal cable to data-driven control via optical cable. In the same way, we make progress from the conventional method where signal devices interlock directly to the indirect interlock that uses reservations.
In railway transportation services, needs for the best safety and reliability have been rising even further. This system satisfies those needs and can be expected to work as important infrastructure in the future signal control system. Takashi Kunifuji graduated from Tsukuba University, Japan, in 1992 with a Master's degree in Electrical Engineering.
He has joined JR East since 1992. And now works as a Manager of Research and Development Center of JR East group at East Japan Railway Company.
He has engaged in development of railway signal control systems since 1998. He had engaged in maintenance, design, and construction of signaling systems from 1992 to 1998.
Mr. Kunifuji is a member of IPSJ, IEEJ and ACM. 
Jun Nishiyama
